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Name: debt1consolidation.com
Date: 10/22/07
Message: <a href="http://www.Debt1consolidation.com "> A payday loan is a short-term loan that you promise to pay back from your next pay cheque. A payday loan is sometimes also called a payday advance. Normally, you have to pay back a payday loan on or before your next payday (usually in two weeks or less). The amount you can borrow is usually limited to 30 percent of the net amount of your pay cheque. The net amount of your pay cheque is your total pay, after any deductions such as income taxes. For example, if your pay cheque is $1,000 net every two weeks, your payday loan could be for a maximum of $300 ($1,000 x 30%). Before giving you a payday loan, lenders will ask for proof that you have a regular income, a permanent address and an active bank account. Some payday lenders also require that you be over the age of 18. To make sure you pay back the loan, all payday lenders will ask you to provide a postdated cheque or to authorize a direct withdrawal from your bank account for the amount of the loan, plus all the different fees and interest charges that will be added to the original amount of the loan. The combination of multiple fees and interest charges are what make payday loans so expensive (Click here for an explanation of the various fees associated with these types of loans. The lender should also ask you to sign a loan agreement. If the lender does not offer to give you a copy of the loan agreement, ask for one. Read this document carefully before signing it, and keep a copy for your records How and when do I pay back the loan? A payday loan agreement usually says that you must pay the total amount you owe for the loan on or before the date stated in your loan agreement. This includes the amount you borrowed, plus interest and any additional fees and charges. Some lenders will cash your postdated cheque or process your direct withdrawal on the day the loan is due. However, some lenders may require that you pay the loan in cash, on or before the due date. If you have not paid the loan in cash by the due date, some lenders may cash your cheque or process the direct withdrawal you signed on the day after your loan's due date, and charge you another fee. Ask the lender what the most inexpensive way is for you to repay your loan. How does a payday loan affect my credit report? Credit-reporting agencies collect information on whether or not you make your payments on time. This information, also called your "credit history", is part of your credit report and is used to calculate your credit score. Making payments on time can help improve your credit score by demonstrating that you are able to manage your debt. Even if you have poor credit, you can rebuild it by using a credit card or other type of credit and paying back the money you owe on time. This is not the case with payday loans. Since payday lenders are not currently members of the main credit-reporting agencies, getting a payday loan and paying it off on time will not improve your credit score. However, if you do not pay your loan back on time and it is sent to a collection agency, this will likely be reported to a credit-reporting agency and could have a negative impact on your credit report. How much will a payday loan cost? A payday loan is much more expensive than most other types of loans offered by financial institutions such as banks or credit unions. Before you apply for a payday loan, find out about all the fees and charges you will have to pay �� including the fees you will be charged if you cannot repay the loan on time. The fees may not be easy to see right away, so read the agreement carefully before signing it. If you do not receive an explanation of all of the fees, charges and interest that will apply to the loan, or if you are not satisfied with the explanation you receive, do not sign the loan agreement. How does the cost of a payday loan compare with other credit products? Payday loans are much more expensive than other types of loans, including credit cards. But how much are you really paying? How does the cost of a payday loan compare with taking a cash advance on a credit card, using overdraft protection on your bank account or borrowing on a line of credit? Let's compare the cost of using different types of loans. We'll assume that you borrow $300, for 14 days. Note the considerable difference in the cost of each type of loan. Things to consider before you apply for a payday loan Even if you think you may be turned down, ask your bank or credit union for overdraft protection on your bank account, or a line of credit. These are relatively inexpensive ways of obtaining access to extra funds, for short-term use. If you are turned down for any of these credit options, ask why. If the reason is that you have a poor credit history, contact the three credit-reporting agencies to get a copy of your credit report. Read the reports carefully to make sure that all of the information in it is correct. If you find any errors, contact the credit-reporting agency to find out how you can have the information corrected. The three major credit-reporting agencies in Canada are Equifax Canada, TransUnion Canada and Northern Credit Bureaus. All three of these agencies will give you a copy of your credit report for free if you request that it be sent to you by regular mail. Ask yourself if you really need to take out a loan, or whether you can get by until your next pay cheque. If you need the money immediately, try to make other arrangements. For example, you may be able to cash in vacation days. Or you might consider getting a short-term loan from a family member or a friend. If you find that you need to apply for a payday loan because you have no alternative, only borrow an amount that you are 100 percent sure you can repay on the due date of the loan. Don't borrow more than you need. Things to consider if you take out a payday loan Don't be afraid to ask a lot of questions. Read carefully �� and take home with you �� a copy of the loan agreement that you are being asked to sign. Don't feel pressured to sign the loan agreement right away if you have questions and want more time to read through the agreement on your own. If the lender does not want to give you a copy of the agreement, look for another lender. Be sure to ask about all the fees, charges and interest that apply when you first get the loan, and what other charges you will owe if you can't pay the loan back on time. If you are taking out a payday loan at another location to pay back the first payday loan, or you are extending or "rolling over" the loan that you had with the same lender, you could find yourself in serious financial difficulty. The fees, charges and interest will add up quickly on these types of loans, which can put you into serious debt. How can I figure out the cost of each type of loan? To estimate the total cost of a loan, including the annual cost of the loan expressed as a percentage of the amount borrowed, follow the steps below. Step 1: Determine how much interest you will pay. First, find out the annual interest rate that applies to the loan (if there is one). Figure out the daily interest rate by dividing the annual interest rate of the loan by 365 days. Then, multiply that rate by the length of time you are taking the loan. Finally, multiply the result by the amount you will borrow, in dollars: Amount of interest = Annual interest rate -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 365 days �� Length of the loan (number of days) �� Amount of the loan Step 2: Determine the total cost of the loan by adding any fees that may apply to the interest you will have to pay. Find out what fees apply to the loan and add them to the cost of the interest, found in Step 1: Total cost of the loan = Amount of interest + Total fees Step 3: Estimate the annual cost of the loan, expressed as a percentage of the amount borrowed. First, divide the total cost of the loan, found in Step 2, by the amount of the loan. Then, divide this rate by the length of time you are taking the loan (in days) and multiply it by 365 (the number of days in the year): Annual cost of the loan (%) = Cost of the loan -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Amount of the loan �� Length of the loan (number of days) �� 365 days Let's find out the cost of a $300 payday loan, taken for 14 days. We'll assume that the lender charges you a one-time set-up fee of $10 and a service fee of $40, which includes interest on the loan. Step 1: Determine how much interest you will pay. In this case, there is no interest fee. The interest is therefore $0. Step 2: Figure out the cost of the loan by adding together any fees that apply and the interest you will have to pay. In this case, you would add the $10 set-up fee and the $40 service fee together: $10 + $40 = $50 Step 3: Estimate the total annual cost of the loan, expressed as a percentage of the amount borrowed: Annual cost of the loan (%) = Cost of the loan -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Amount of the loan �� Length of the loan (number of days) �� 365 days = $50 �� 14 days �� 365 days $300 = 4.35 or approximately 435% The total cost of the payday loan would be $50 with an annual cost of 435 percent of the amount borrowed. Information asymmetries are common in credit market models, but the usual assumption, at least in commercial lending, is that borrowers are the better informed party and that lenders have to screen and monitor to assess whether firms are creditworthy. The opposite asymmetry, as we assume here, does not seem implausible in the context of consumer lending. "Fringe" borrowers are less educated than mainstream borrowers (Caskey 2003), and many are first-time borrowers (or are rebounding from a failed first foray into credit). Lenders know from experience with large numbers of borrowers, whereas the borrower may only have their own experience to guide them. Credit can also be confusing; after marriage, mortgages are probably the most complicated contract most people ever enter. Given the subtleties involved with credit, and the supposed lack of sophistication of sub-prime borrowers, our assumption that lenders know better seems plausible. While lenders might deceive households about several variables that in fluence household loan demand, we focus on income. We suppose that lenders exaggerate household's future income in order boost loan demand. Our borrowers are gullible, in the sense that they can be fooled about their future income, but they borrow rationally given their beliefs. Fooling borrowers is costly to lenders, where the costs could represent conscience, technological costs (of learning the pitch), or risk of prosecution. The upside to exaggerating borrowers' income prospects is obvious��they borrow more. As long as the extra borrowing does not increase default risk too much, and as long as deceiving borrowers is easy enough, income deception and predatory��welfare reducing��lending may occur. After de fining predatory lending, we test whether payday lending fi ts our definition. Payday lenders make small, short-term loans to mostly lower-middle income households. The business is booming, but critics condemn payday lending, especially the high fees and frequent loan rollovers, as predatory. Many states prohibit payday loans outright, or indirectly, via usury limits. To test whether payday lending quali fies as predatory, we compared debt and delinquency rates for households in states that allow payday lending to those in states that do not. We focus especially on di fferences across states households that, according to our model, seem more vulnerable to predation: households with more income uncertainly or less education. We use smoking as a third, more ambiguous, proxy for households with high, or perhaps hyperbolic, discount rates. In general, high discounters will pay higher future costs for a given, immediate, gain in welfare. Smokers' seem to fit that description. What makes the smoking proxy ambiguous is that smokers may have hyperbolic, not just high, discount rates. Hyperbolic discount rates decline over time in a way that leads to procrastination and selfcontrol problems (Laibson 1997). The hyperbolic discounter postpones quitting smoking, or repaying credit. Without knowing whether smokers discount rates are merely high, or hyperbolic, we will not be able to say whether any extra debt for smokers in payday states is welfare reducing. 2 Given those proxies, we use a di fference-in-difference approach to test whether payday lending fits our definition of predatory. First we look for diff erences in household debt and delinquency across payday states and non-payday states, then we test whether those di fference are higher for potential prey. To ensure that any such differences are not merely state e ffects, we difference a third time across time by comparing whether those di fferences changed after the advent of payday lending circa 1995. That triple di fference identifies any di fference in debt and delinquency for potential prey in payday states after payday lending was introduced. Our findings seem mostly inconsistent with the hypothesis that payday lenders prey on, i.e., lower the welfare of, households with uncertain income or households with less education. Those types of households who happen to live in states that allow unlimited payday loans are less likely to report being turned down for credit, but are not more likely, by and large, to report higher debt levels, contrary to the overborrowing prediction of our model. Nor are such households more likely to have missed a debt payment in the previous year. On the contrary, households with uncertain income who live in states with unlimited payday loans are less likely to have missed a debt payment over the previous year. The latter result is consistent with claims by defenders of payday lending that some households borrow from 2 Consistent with a high discount rate, Munasinghe and Sicherman (2000) discover that smokers have fl atter wage profiles and they are willing to trade more future earnings for a given increase in current earnings. Gruber and Mulainathan (2002) find that high cigarette taxes make smokers "happier," consistent with hypberbolic discount rates (because taxes help smokers commit to quitting). DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) show how credit card lenders can manipulate hyperbolic discounters by front-loading bene fits and back-loading costs. payday lenders to avoid missing payments on other debt. On the whole, our results seem consistent with the hypothesis that payday lending represents a legitimate increase in the supply of credit, not a contrived increase in credit demand. We find some interesting differences for smokers, but those diff erences are harder to interpret in relation to the predatory hypothesis without knowing apriori whether smokers are hyperbolic, or merely high, discounters. We also find, using a small set of data from different sources, that payday loan rates and fees decline signi ficantly as the number of payday lenders and pawnshops increase. Reformers often advocate usury limits to lower payday loan fees but our evidence suggests that competition among payday lenders (and pawnshops) works to lower payday loan prices. Our paper has several cousins in the academic literature. Ausubel (1991) argues that credit card lenders exploit their superior information about household credit demand in their marketing and pricing of credit cards. The predators in our model pro fit from their information advantage as well. Our concept of income delusion or deception also has a behavioral fl avor, as well, hence our use of smoking as a proxy for self-control problems. Brunnermeier and Parker (2004), for example, imagine that households choose what to expect about future income (or other outcomes). High hopes give households' current "felicity," even if it distorts borrowing and other income-dependent decisions. Our households have high hopes for income, and they make bad borrowing decisions, but we do not count the current felicity from high hopes as an o ffset to the welfare loss from overborrowing. Our costly falsi fication (of household income prospects) and costly verification (by counselors) resemble Townsend's (1979) costly state veri fication and Lacker andWeinbergs' (1989) costly state falsi fication. The main difference here is that the falsifying and verifying comes before income is realized, not after. More importantly, we hope our findings inform the current, very real-world debate, around predatory lending. The stakes in that debate are high: millions of lower income households borrow regularly from thousands of payday loan o ffices around the country. If payday lenders raise household welfare by relaxing credit constraints, anti-predatory legislation may lower it. Payday lenders make small, short-term loans to households. The typical loan is about $300 for two weeks. The typical fee is $15 per $100 borrowed. Lenders require two recent pay stubs (as proof of employment), and a recent bank account statement. Borrowers secure the loan with a post-dated personal check for the loan amount plus fees. When the loan matures, lenders deposit the check. Payday lending evolved from check cashing much like bank lending evolved from deposit taking. For a fee, check cashiers turn personal paychecks into cash. After cashing several paychecks for the same customer, lending against f uture paychecks was a natural next step. High finance charges is the main criticism against payday lenders. The typical fee of $15 per $100 per two weeks implies an annual interest rate of 15 x365/14, or 390 percent. Payday lenders are also criticize for overlending, in the sense that borrowers often re finance their loans repeatedly, and for "targeting" women making the transition from welfare-to-work (Fox and Mierzewski 2001) and soldiers (Graves and Peterson 2004). Despite their critics, payday lending has boomed. The number of payday advance o ffices grew from 0 in 1990 to 14 , 000 in 2003 (Stegman and Harris 2003). The industry originated $8 to $14 billion in loans in 2000, implying 26-47 million individual loans. Rapid entry suggests the industry is pro fitable. Payday lenders present sti ff competition for pawnshops, even though the internet, namely E-bay, signi ficantly foreclosure costs for pawnshops (Caskey 2003). The number of pawn shops in the U.S. grew about six percent per year between 1986 and 1996, but growth essentially stalled from 1997 to 2003. Prices of shares in EZCorp, the largest, publicly traded pawn shop holder, were essentially flat or declining between 1994 and 2004, while Ace Cash Express share prices, a retail financial firm selling check cashing and payday loans, rose substantially over that period (Figure 4). EZCorp CEO, Joseph Rotunday, blamed payday lenders for pawnshops' dismal performance: The company had been progressing very nicely until the late 1990s.... (when) a new product called payroll advance/payday loans came along and provided our customer base an alternative choice. Many of them elected the payday loan over the traditional pawn loan. (Quoted by Caskey (2003) p.14). Payday lending is heavily regulated (Table 1). As of 2001, eighteen states e ffectively prohibited payday loans via usury limits, and most other states prices, loan size, and loan frequency per customer (Fox and Mierzwinski 2001). Note that the payday loan limit ranges from 0 (where payday loans are illegal) to 1250. Nine states allow unlimited payday loans. Payday lenders have circumvented usury limits by a ffiliating with national or state chartered banks, but the Comptroller of the Currency��the overseer of nationally chartered banks�Crecently banned such a ffiliations. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation still permits payday lenders to a ffiliate with state banks, but recently restricted those partnerships (Graves and Peterson 2005). Regulatory risk��the threat of costly or disabling legislation in the future��looms large for Payday lenders. The Utah legislature is reconsidering its permissive laws governing payday lending. North Carolina recently drove payday lenders from the state by expressly outlawing the practice. Heavy regulation increases the cost of payday lending. High regulatory risk increases limits entry into the industry and increases the expected return required by industry investors. Driving up costs and driving away investors may be exactly what regulators intended if they view payday lending as predatory. We de fine predatory lending as a welfare reducing provision of credit. Households can be made worse o ff by borrowing if lenders can deceive households into borrowing more than is optimal. Excess borrowing reduces household welfare, and may increase default risk. We illustrate our concept of predatory lending in a standard model of household borrowing. Before we get to predatory lending, we review basic principles about welfare improving lending, the type that lets households maintain their consumption despite fluctuations in their income. The model has two periods: today (period zero) and payday (period one. Household income goes up and down periodically, but not randomly (for now): income equals zero today and y on payday. If households consume Ct in period t, their utility is U (Ct) .Household welfare is the sum of utility over both periods: U (C0)+ ��U (C1), where �� equals the household's time rate of discount. Households with high �� value current consumption highly relative to future consumption. In other words, high discounters are impatient. A digression here on discount rates serves later discussion. In classical economics �� is constant. If �� changes over time, so does household behavior, even if nothing else changes. If ��(t) is hyperbolic, households will postpone unpleasant tasks until current consumption does not seem so precious relative to future consumption (Laibson 1997). With hyperbolic discounting, that day never arrives, so hyperbolic discounters have behavioral problems: they procrastinate. They may never repay debt, much less begin saving. Hyperbolic discounters who start smoking may never quit. Returning to the model, if the marginal utility of consumption ( U 0) is diminishing, households will demand credit to reduce fluctuations in their standard of living. Households without credit, however, must fend for themselves (autarky). Welfare under autarky equals U (0)+��U (y). The fluctuations in consumption for households without credit make autarky a possible worst case, and hence, a good benchmark for comparing cases with credit. If households borrow B at interest rate r, welfare equals U (B) + ��U (y − (1 + r)B). Borrowing increases utility in period zero, when the proceeds are consumed, but lowers utility in period one, when households pay for their borrowing. Rational, informed households trade o ff the good and bad side of borrowing; they borrow until the marginal utility of consuming another unit today just equals the marginal, discounted disutility of repaying the extra debt on payday: U 0(B) = ��(1 + r)U 0(y − (1 + r)B). (1) Equation (1) determines household loan demand as a function of their income, their discount rate, and the market interest rate: B(y, ��, r). For standard utility functions, household loan demand is increasing in income and decreasing in the discount factor and interest rate: By > 0; B �� < 0; Br < 0. Household welfare with optimal borrowing equals U (B(y, r, d))+��U (y − (1+r)B( y, r, ��)). As long as households follow (1), their welfare with positive borrowing must be higher than without (autarky). The welfare gain from borrowing depends on the cost of credit production. Suppose the cost of lending $ B to a particular household equals (1 + ��)B + f, where �� represents the opportunity cost per unit loaned and f is the fixed cost per loan. Think of f as the cost of record-keeping and credit check required for each loan, however large or small the loan may be. If the going price for loans is (1+ r) per unit borrowed, the lenders' profits equal ( r − ��)B − f. With perfect competition among lenders, the loan interest rate is competed down until it just covers the costs of the loan: r = �� + f /B. Equilibrium r and B are determined where that credit supply curve equals demand (1). Equilibrium in the payday credit market is illustrated in Figure (3). If fixed costs per loan are prohibitively high, the market may not exist. Perhaps the payday lending technology lowered the fixed cost per loan enough to make the business viable.3 Before the advent of payday lending, households who applied to banks for a very small, short-term loan may have been denied. Fixed costs per loan imply that smaller loans will cost more per dollar borrowed than larger loans. That means households with low credit demand will pay higher rates than households with high loan demand. Loan demand is increasing in income, so high income households who demand larger quantities of credit will enjoy a "quantity" discount, while lower income households will pay a "small lot" premium, or penalty. That price "discrimination" is not invidious, however; the higher cost of smaller loans re flects the fixed costs of lending. The high price of payday loans may partly re flect the combination of fixed costs and small loan amounts (Flannery and Samolyk 2005). A usury limit lowers household welfare. Suppose the maximum legal interest rate is r. At that maximum rate, the minimum loan that lenders' cost is f /(r− ��) = B. Low income households with loan demand less than B face a beggar's choice: borrow B at r or do not borrow at all. Such households would be willing to pay more to to avoid going without credit, so raising the usury limit would raise welfare for those households. Competition is another key determinant of how much households gains from borrowing. 3 Alternatively, or additionaly, the demand for small, short term loans may have increased in the mid 1990s. The welfare reform then almost certainly increased demand for such credit as households who once "worked" at home for the government were forced to go to work in the market. Even with no competition �� monopoly��households cannot be worse o ff than under autarky. The monopolist raises interest rates until the marginal revenue from higher rates equals the marginal cost from lower loan demand: B (y, r) = −(r − ��)Br(y, r) . (2) At that monopoly interest rate, rm, household loan demand equals B(y, rm).Household welfare under monopoly equals U (Br(y, r m))+��U (y −(1+ rm)Br(y, r m)). Welfare is lower under monopoly because credit costs more and their standard of living fluctuates more (because costly credit reduces their demand for credit) If households borrow from the monopolist, however, they must better o ff than without credit. In sum, welfare for rational households is highest if credit is available at competitive prices. If households choose to borrow, they must be at least as well o ff as they were without credit. Limiting loan rates cannot raise household welfare and may reduce it. Monopoly lenders lower household welfare, but even with a monopolist, households cannot be worse o ff than without credit. The high cost of payday lending may partly re flect fixed costs per loan. Before payday lending, those fixed costs may have been prohibitive; very small, short-term loans may not have been worthwhile for banks. The payday lending technology may have lowered those fi xed costs, thus increasing the supply of credit to low income households demanding small loans. That version of the genesis of payday lending suggests the innovation was welfare improving, not predatory. In the textbook model household welfare cannot be lower than under autarky because households are fully informed and rational. Here we show households how can be made worse o ff than without credit if predatory lenders can delude households about their (households') future income. Suppose that by spending C(�� ), lenders can convince a prospective borrower that her income on payday will be y +��. The cost C can be interpreted variously as the cost of a guilty </a>

Name: debt1consolidation.com
Date: 10/22/07
Message: <a href=http://www.debt1consolidation.com> Having trouble paying your bills? Getting dunning notices from creditors? Are your accounts being turned over to debt collectors? Are you worried about losing your home or your car? You're not alone. Many people face a financial crisis some time in their lives. Whether the crisis is caused by personal or family illness, the loss of a job, or overspending, it can seem overwhelming. But often, it can be overcome. Your financial situation doesn't have to go from bad to worse. If you or someone you know is in financial hot water, consider these options: realistic budgeting, credit counseling from a reputable organization, debt consolidation, or bankruptcy. Debt negotiation is yet another option. How do you know which will work best for you? It depends on your level of debt, your level of discipline, and your prospects for the future. Self-Help Developing a Budget: The first step toward taking control of your financial situation is to do a realistic assessment of how much money you take in and how much money you spend. Start by listing your income from all sources. Then, list your "fixed" expenses ? those that are the same each month ? like mortgage payments or rent, car payments, and insurance premiums. Next, list the expenses that vary ? like entertainment, recreation, and clothing. Writing down all your expenses, even those that seem insignificant, is a helpful way to track your spending patterns, identify necessary expenses, and prioritize the rest. The goal is to make sure you can make ends meet on the basics: housing, food, health care, insurance, and education. Your public library and bookstores have information about budgeting and money management techniques. In addition, computer software programs can be useful tools for developing and maintaining a budget, balancing your checkbook, and creating plans to save money and pay down your debt. Contacting Your Creditors: Contact your creditors immediately if you're having trouble making ends meet. Tell them why it's difficult for you, and try to work out a modified payment plan that reduces your payments to a more manageable level. Don't wait until your accounts have been turned over to a debt collector. At that point, your creditors have given up on you. Dealing with Debt Collectors: The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is the federal law that dictates how and when a debt collector may contact you. A debt collector may not call you before 8 a.m., after 9 p.m., or while you're at work if the collector knows that your employer doesn't approve of the calls. Collectors may not harass you, lie, or use unfair practices when they try to collect a debt. And they must honor a written request from you to stop further contact. Managing Your Auto and Home Loans: Your debts can be unsecured or secured. Secured debts usually are tied to an asset, like your car for a car loan, or your house for a mortgage. If you stop making payments, lenders can repossess your car or foreclose on your house. Unsecured debts are not tied to any asset, and include most credit card debt, bills for medical care, signature loans, and debts for other types of services. Most automobile financing agreements allow a creditor to repossess your car any time you're in default. No notice is required. If your car is repossessed, you may have to pay the balance due on the loan, as well as towing and storage costs, to get it back. If you can't do this, the creditor may sell the car. If you see default approaching, you may be better off selling the car yourself and paying off the debt: You'll avoid the added costs of repossession and a negative entry on your credit report. If you fall behind on your mortgage, contact your lender immediately to avoid foreclosure. Most lenders are willing to work with you if they believe you're acting in good faith and the situation is temporary. Some lenders may reduce or suspend your payments for a short time. When you resume regular payments, though, you may have to pay an additional amount toward the past due total. Other lenders may agree to change the terms of the mortgage by extending the repayment period to reduce the monthly debt. Ask whether additional fees would be assessed for these changes, and calculate how much they total in the long term. If you and your lender cannot work out a plan, contact a housing counseling agency. Some agencies limit their counseling services to homeowners with FHA mortgages, but many offer free help to any homeowner who's having trouble making mortgage payments. Call the local office of the Department of Housing and Urban Development or the housing authority in your state, city, or county for help in finding a legitimate housing counseling agency near you Credit Counseling and Debt Management Plans Credit Counseling: If you're not disciplined enough to create a workable budget and stick to it, can't work out a repayment plan with your creditors, or can't keep track of mounting bills, consider contacting a credit counseling organization. Many credit counseling organizations are nonprofit and work with you to solve your financial problems. But be aware that, just because an organization says it's "nonprofit," there's no guarantee that its services are free, affordable, or even legitimate. In fact, some credit counseling organizations charge high fees, which may be hidden, or urge consumers to make "voluntary" contributions that can cause more debt. Most credit counselors offer services through local offices, the Internet, or on the telephone. If possible, find an organization that offers in-person counseling. Many universities, military bases, credit unions, housing authorities, and branches of the U.S. Cooperative Extension Service operate nonprofit credit counseling programs. Your financial institution, local consumer protection agency, and friends and family also may be good sources of information and referrals. Reputable credit counseling organizations can advise you on managing your money and debts, help you develop a budget, and offer free educational materials and workshops. Their counselors are certified and trained in the areas of consumer credit, money and debt management, and budgeting. Counselors discuss your entire financial situation with you, and help you develop a personalized plan to solve your money problems. An initial counseling session typically lasts an hour, with an offer of follow-up sessions. Debt Management Plans: If your financial problems stem from too much debt or your inability to repay your debts, a credit counseling agency may recommend that you enroll in a debt management plan (DMP). A DMP alone is not credit counseling, and DMPs are not for everyone. You should sign up for one of these plans only after a certified credit counselor has spent time thoroughly reviewing your financial situation, and has offered you customized advice on managing your money. Even if a DMP is appropriate for you, a reputable credit counseling organization still can help you create a budget and teach you money management skills. In a DMP, you deposit money each month with the credit counseling organization, which uses your deposits to pay your unsecured debts, like your credit card bills, student loans, and medical bills, according to a payment schedule the counselor develops with you and your creditors. Your creditors may agree to lower your interest rates or waive certain fees, but check with all your creditors to be sure they offer the concessions that a credit counseling organization describes to you. A successful DMP requires you to make regular, timely payments, and could take 48 months or more to complete. Ask the credit counselor to estimate how long it will take for you to complete the plan. You may have to agree not to apply for ? or use ? any additional credit while you're participating in the plan. Protect Yourself Be wary of credit counseling organizations that: charge high up-front or monthly fees for enrolling in credit counseling or a DMP. pressure you to make "voluntary contributions," another name for fees. won't send you free information about the services they provide without requiring you to provide personal financial information, such as credit card account numbers, and balances. try to enroll you in a DMP without spending time reviewing your financial situation. offer to enroll you in a DMP without teaching you budgeting and money management skills. demand that you make payments into a DMP before your creditors have accepted you into the program. Debt Consolidation You may be able to lower your cost of credit by consolidating your debt through a second mortgage or a home equity line of credit. Remember that these loans require you to put up your home as collateral. If you can't make the payments ? or if your payments are late ? you could lose your home. What's more, the costs of consolidation loans can add up. In addition to interest on the loans, you may have to pay "points," with one point equal to one percent of the amount you borrow. Still, these loans may provide certain tax advantages that are not available with other kinds of credit. Bankruptcy Personal bankruptcy generally is considered the debt management option of last resort because the results are long-lasting and far reaching. People who follow the bankruptcy rules receive a discharge ? a court order that says they don't have to repay certain debts. However, bankruptcy information (both the date of your filing and the later date of discharge) stay on your credit report for 10 years, and can make it difficult to obtain credit, buy a home, get life insurance, or sometimes get a job. Still, bankruptcy is a legal procedure that offers a fresh start for people who have gotten into financial difficulty and can't satisfy their debts. There are two primary types of personal bankruptcy: Chapter 13 and Chapter 7. Each must be filed in federal bankruptcy court. As of April 2006, the filing fees run about $274 for Chapter 13 and $299 for Chapter 7. Attorney fees are additional and can vary. Effective October 2005, Congress made sweeping changes to the bankruptcy laws. The net effect of these changes is to give consumers more incentive to seek bankruptcy relief under Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7. Chapter 13 allows people with a steady income to keep property, like a mortgaged house or a car, that they might otherwise lose through the bankruptcy process. In Chapter 13, the court approves a repayment plan that allows you to use your future income to pay off your debts during a three-to-five-year period, rather than surrender any property. After you have made all the payments under the plan, you receive a discharge of your debts. Chapter 7 is known as straight bankruptcy, and involves liquidation of all assets that are not exempt. Exempt property may include automobiles, work-related tools, and basic household furnishings. Some of your property may be sold by a court-appointed official ? a trustee ? or turned over to your creditors. The new bankruptcy laws have changed the time period during which you can receive a discharge through Chapter 7. You now must wait 8 years after receiving a discharge in Chapter 7 before you can file again under that chapter. The Chapter 13 waiting period is much shorter and can be as little as two years between filings. Both types of bankruptcy may get rid of unsecured debts and stop foreclosures, repossessions, garnishments and utility shut-offs, and debt collection activities. Both also provide exemptions that allow people to keep certain assets, although exemption amounts vary by state. Note that personal bankruptcy usually does not erase child support, alimony, fines, taxes, and some student loan obligations. And, unless you have an acceptable plan to catch up on your debt under Chapter 13, bankruptcy usually does not allow you to keep property when your creditor has an unpaid mortgage or security lien on it. Another major change to the bankruptcy laws involves certain hurdles that a consumer must clear before even filing for bankruptcy, no matter what the chapter. You must get credit counseling from a government-approved organization within six months before you file for any bankruptcy relief. You can find a state-by-state list of government-approved organizations at www.usdoj.gov/ust. That is the website of the U.S. Trustee Program, the organization within the U.S. Department of Justice that supervises bankruptcy cases and trustees. Also, before you file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, you must satisfy a "means test." This test requires you to confirm that your income does not exceed a certain amount. The amount varies by state and is publicized by the U.S. Trustee Program at www.usdoj.gov/ust. Debt Negotiation Programs Debt negotiation differs greatly from credit counseling and DMPs. It can be very risky, and have a long term negative impact on your credit report and, in turn, your ability to get credit. That's why many states have laws regulating debt negotiation companies and the services they offer. Contact your state Attorney General for more information. The Claims Debt negotiation firms may claim they're nonprofit. They also may claim that they can arrange for your unsecured debt ? typically credit card debt ? to be paid off for anywhere from 10 to 50 percent of the balance owed. For example, if you owe $10,000 on a credit card, a debt negotiation firm may claim it can arrange for you to pay it off with a lesser amount, say $4,000. The firms often pitch their services as an alternative to bankruptcy. They may claim that using their services will have little or no negative impact on your ability to get credit in the future, or that any negative information can be removed from your credit report when you complete their debt negotiation program. The firms usually tell you to stop making payments to your creditors, and instead, send payments to the debt negotiation company. The firm may promise to hold your funds in a special account and pay your creditors on your behalf. The Truth Just because a debt negotiation company describes itself as a "nonprofit" organization, there's no guarantee that the services they offer are legitimate. There also is no guarantee that a creditor will accept partial payment of a legitimate debt. In fact, if you stop making payments on a credit card, late fees and interest usually are added to the debt each month. If you exceed your credit limit, additional fees and charges also can be added. This can cause your original debt to double or triple. What's more, most debt negotiation companies charge consumers substantial fees for their services, including a fee to establish the account with the debt negotiator, a monthly service fee, and a final fee of a percentage of the money you've supposedly saved. While creditors have no obligation to agree to negotiate the amount a consumer owes, they have a legal obligation to provide accurate information to the credit reporting agencies, including your failure to make monthly payments. That can result in a negative entry on your credit report. And in certain situations, creditors may have the right to sue you to recover the money you owe. In some instances, when creditors win a lawsuit, they have the right to garnish your wages or put a lien on your home. Finally, the Internal Revenue Service may consider any amount of forgiven debt to be taxable income. Damage Control Turning to a business that offers help in solving debt problems may seem like a reasonable solution when your bills become unmanageable. But before you do business with any company, check it out with your state Attorney General, local consumer protection agency, and the Better Business Bureau. They can tell you if any consumer complaints are on file about the firm you're considering doing business with. Ask your state Attorney General if the company is required to be licensed to work in your state and, if so, whether it is. Some businesses that offer to help you with your debt problems may charge high fees and fail to follow through on the services they sell. Others may misrepresent the terms of a debt consolidation loan, failing to explain certain costs or mention that you're signing over your home as collateral. Businesses advertising voluntary debt reorganization plans may not explain that the plan is a bankruptcy filing, tell you everything that's involved, or help you through what can be a long and complex process. In addition, some companies guarantee you a loan if you pay a fee in advance. The fee may range from $100 to several hundred dollars. Resist the temptation to follow up on these advance-fee loan guarantees. They may be illegal. It is true that many legitimate creditors offer extensions of credit through telemarketing and require an application or appraisal fee in advance. But legitimate creditors never guarantee that the consumer will get the loan ? or even represent that a loan is likely. Under the federal Telemarketing Sales Rule, a seller or tele-marketer who guarantees or represents a high likelihood of your getting a loan or some other extension of credit may not ask for or accept payment until you've received the loan. You should be cautious of claims from so-called credit repair clinics. Many companies appeal to consumers with poor credit histories, promising to clean up credit reports for a fee. But you already have the right to have any inaccurate information in your file corrected. And a credit repair clinic cannot have accurate information removed from your credit report, despite their promises. You also should know that federal and some state laws prohibit these companies from charging you for their services until the services are fully performed. Only time and a conscientious effort to repay your debts will improve your credit report. If you're thinking about getting help to stabilize your financial situation, do some homework first. Find out what services a business provides and what it costs, and don't rely on verbal promises. Get everything in writing, and read your contracts carefully. </a>

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Name: debt1consolidation.com
Date: 10/15/07
Message: <a href="http://www.Debt1consolidation.com "> A payday loan is a short-term loan that you promise to pay back from your next pay cheque. A payday loan is sometimes also called a payday advance. Normally, you have to pay back a payday loan on or before your next payday (usually in two weeks or less). The amount you can borrow is usually limited to 30 percent of the net amount of your pay cheque. The net amount of your pay cheque is your total pay, after any deductions such as income taxes. For example, if your pay cheque is $1,000 net every two weeks, your payday loan could be for a maximum of $300 ($1,000 x 30%). Before giving you a payday loan, lenders will ask for proof that you have a regular income, a permanent address and an active bank account. Some payday lenders also require that you be over the age of 18. To make sure you pay back the loan, all payday lenders will ask you to provide a postdated cheque or to authorize a direct withdrawal from your bank account for the amount of the loan, plus all the different fees and interest charges that will be added to the original amount of the loan. The combination of multiple fees and interest charges are what make payday loans so expensive (Click here for an explanation of the various fees associated with these types of loans. The lender should also ask you to sign a loan agreement. If the lender does not offer to give you a copy of the loan agreement, ask for one. Read this document carefully before signing it, and keep a copy for your records How and when do I pay back the loan? A payday loan agreement usually says that you must pay the total amount you owe for the loan on or before the date stated in your loan agreement. This includes the amount you borrowed, plus interest and any additional fees and charges. Some lenders will cash your postdated cheque or process your direct withdrawal on the day the loan is due. However, some lenders may require that you pay the loan in cash, on or before the due date. If you have not paid the loan in cash by the due date, some lenders may cash your cheque or process the direct withdrawal you signed on the day after your loan's due date, and charge you another fee. Ask the lender what the most inexpensive way is for you to repay your loan. How does a payday loan affect my credit report? Credit-reporting agencies collect information on whether or not you make your payments on time. This information, also called your "credit history", is part of your credit report and is used to calculate your credit score. Making payments on time can help improve your credit score by demonstrating that you are able to manage your debt. Even if you have poor credit, you can rebuild it by using a credit card or other type of credit and paying back the money you owe on time. This is not the case with payday loans. Since payday lenders are not currently members of the main credit-reporting agencies, getting a payday loan and paying it off on time will not improve your credit score. However, if you do not pay your loan back on time and it is sent to a collection agency, this will likely be reported to a credit-reporting agency and could have a negative impact on your credit report. How much will a payday loan cost? A payday loan is much more expensive than most other types of loans offered by financial institutions such as banks or credit unions. Before you apply for a payday loan, find out about all the fees and charges you will have to pay �� including the fees you will be charged if you cannot repay the loan on time. The fees may not be easy to see right away, so read the agreement carefully before signing it. If you do not receive an explanation of all of the fees, charges and interest that will apply to the loan, or if you are not satisfied with the explanation you receive, do not sign the loan agreement. How does the cost of a payday loan compare with other credit products? Payday loans are much more expensive than other types of loans, including credit cards. But how much are you really paying? How does the cost of a payday loan compare with taking a cash advance on a credit card, using overdraft protection on your bank account or borrowing on a line of credit? Let's compare the cost of using different types of loans. We'll assume that you borrow $300, for 14 days. Note the considerable difference in the cost of each type of loan. Things to consider before you apply for a payday loan Even if you think you may be turned down, ask your bank or credit union for overdraft protection on your bank account, or a line of credit. These are relatively inexpensive ways of obtaining access to extra funds, for short-term use. If you are turned down for any of these credit options, ask why. If the reason is that you have a poor credit history, contact the three credit-reporting agencies to get a copy of your credit report. Read the reports carefully to make sure that all of the information in it is correct. If you find any errors, contact the credit-reporting agency to find out how you can have the information corrected. The three major credit-reporting agencies in Canada are Equifax Canada, TransUnion Canada and Northern Credit Bureaus. All three of these agencies will give you a copy of your credit report for free if you request that it be sent to you by regular mail. Ask yourself if you really need to take out a loan, or whether you can get by until your next pay cheque. If you need the money immediately, try to make other arrangements. For example, you may be able to cash in vacation days. Or you might consider getting a short-term loan from a family member or a friend. If you find that you need to apply for a payday loan because you have no alternative, only borrow an amount that you are 100 percent sure you can repay on the due date of the loan. Don't borrow more than you need. Things to consider if you take out a payday loan Don't be afraid to ask a lot of questions. Read carefully �� and take home with you �� a copy of the loan agreement that you are being asked to sign. Don't feel pressured to sign the loan agreement right away if you have questions and want more time to read through the agreement on your own. If the lender does not want to give you a copy of the agreement, look for another lender. Be sure to ask about all the fees, charges and interest that apply when you first get the loan, and what other charges you will owe if you can't pay the loan back on time. If you are taking out a payday loan at another location to pay back the first payday loan, or you are extending or "rolling over" the loan that you had with the same lender, you could find yourself in serious financial difficulty. The fees, charges and interest will add up quickly on these types of loans, which can put you into serious debt. How can I figure out the cost of each type of loan? To estimate the total cost of a loan, including the annual cost of the loan expressed as a percentage of the amount borrowed, follow the steps below. Step 1: Determine how much interest you will pay. First, find out the annual interest rate that applies to the loan (if there is one). Figure out the daily interest rate by dividing the annual interest rate of the loan by 365 days. Then, multiply that rate by the length of time you are taking the loan. Finally, multiply the result by the amount you will borrow, in dollars: Amount of interest = Annual interest rate -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 365 days �� Length of the loan (number of days) �� Amount of the loan Step 2: Determine the total cost of the loan by adding any fees that may apply to the interest you will have to pay. Find out what fees apply to the loan and add them to the cost of the interest, found in Step 1: Total cost of the loan = Amount of interest + Total fees Step 3: Estimate the annual cost of the loan, expressed as a percentage of the amount borrowed. First, divide the total cost of the loan, found in Step 2, by the amount of the loan. Then, divide this rate by the length of time you are taking the loan (in days) and multiply it by 365 (the number of days in the year): Annual cost of the loan (%) = Cost of the loan -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Amount of the loan �� Length of the loan (number of days) �� 365 days Let's find out the cost of a $300 payday loan, taken for 14 days. We'll assume that the lender charges you a one-time set-up fee of $10 and a service fee of $40, which includes interest on the loan. Step 1: Determine how much interest you will pay. In this case, there is no interest fee. The interest is therefore $0. Step 2: Figure out the cost of the loan by adding together any fees that apply and the interest you will have to pay. In this case, you would add the $10 set-up fee and the $40 service fee together: $10 + $40 = $50 Step 3: Estimate the total annual cost of the loan, expressed as a percentage of the amount borrowed: Annual cost of the loan (%) = Cost of the loan -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Amount of the loan �� Length of the loan (number of days) �� 365 days = $50 �� 14 days �� 365 days $300 = 4.35 or approximately 435% The total cost of the payday loan would be $50 with an annual cost of 435 percent of the amount borrowed. Information asymmetries are common in credit market models, but the usual assumption, at least in commercial lending, is that borrowers are the better informed party and that lenders have to screen and monitor to assess whether firms are creditworthy. The opposite asymmetry, as we assume here, does not seem implausible in the context of consumer lending. "Fringe" borrowers are less educated than mainstream borrowers (Caskey 2003), and many are first-time borrowers (or are rebounding from a failed first foray into credit). Lenders know from experience with large numbers of borrowers, whereas the borrower may only have their own experience to guide them. Credit can also be confusing; after marriage, mortgages are probably the most complicated contract most people ever enter. Given the subtleties involved with credit, and the supposed lack of sophistication of sub-prime borrowers, our assumption that lenders know better seems plausible. While lenders might deceive households about several variables that in fluence household loan demand, we focus on income. We suppose that lenders exaggerate household's future income in order boost loan demand. Our borrowers are gullible, in the sense that they can be fooled about their future income, but they borrow rationally given their beliefs. Fooling borrowers is costly to lenders, where the costs could represent conscience, technological costs (of learning the pitch), or risk of prosecution. The upside to exaggerating borrowers' income prospects is obvious��they borrow more. As long as the extra borrowing does not increase default risk too much, and as long as deceiving borrowers is easy enough, income deception and predatory��welfare reducing��lending may occur. After de fining predatory lending, we test whether payday lending fi ts our definition. Payday lenders make small, short-term loans to mostly lower-middle income households. The business is booming, but critics condemn payday lending, especially the high fees and frequent loan rollovers, as predatory. Many states prohibit payday loans outright, or indirectly, via usury limits. To test whether payday lending quali fies as predatory, we compared debt and delinquency rates for households in states that allow payday lending to those in states that do not. We focus especially on di fferences across states households that, according to our model, seem more vulnerable to predation: households with more income uncertainly or less education. We use smoking as a third, more ambiguous, proxy for households with high, or perhaps hyperbolic, discount rates. In general, high discounters will pay higher future costs for a given, immediate, gain in welfare. Smokers' seem to fit that description. What makes the smoking proxy ambiguous is that smokers may have hyperbolic, not just high, discount rates. Hyperbolic discount rates decline over time in a way that leads to procrastination and selfcontrol problems (Laibson 1997). The hyperbolic discounter postpones quitting smoking, or repaying credit. Without knowing whether smokers discount rates are merely high, or hyperbolic, we will not be able to say whether any extra debt for smokers in payday states is welfare reducing. 2 Given those proxies, we use a di fference-in-difference approach to test whether payday lending fits our definition of predatory. First we look for diff erences in household debt and delinquency across payday states and non-payday states, then we test whether those di fference are higher for potential prey. To ensure that any such differences are not merely state e ffects, we difference a third time across time by comparing whether those di fferences changed after the advent of payday lending circa 1995. That triple di fference identifies any di fference in debt and delinquency for potential prey in payday states after payday lending was introduced. Our findings seem mostly inconsistent with the hypothesis that payday lenders prey on, i.e., lower the welfare of, households with uncertain income or households with less education. Those types of households who happen to live in states that allow unlimited payday loans are less likely to report being turned down for credit, but are not more likely, by and large, to report higher debt levels, contrary to the overborrowing prediction of our model. Nor are such households more likely to have missed a debt payment in the previous year. On the contrary, households with uncertain income who live in states with unlimited payday loans are less likely to have missed a debt payment over the previous year. The latter result is consistent with claims by defenders of payday lending that some households borrow from 2 Consistent with a high discount rate, Munasinghe and Sicherman (2000) discover that smokers have fl atter wage profiles and they are willing to trade more future earnings for a given increase in current earnings. Gruber and Mulainathan (2002) find that high cigarette taxes make smokers "happier," consistent with hypberbolic discount rates (because taxes help smokers commit to quitting). DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) show how credit card lenders can manipulate hyperbolic discounters by front-loading bene fits and back-loading costs. payday lenders to avoid missing payments on other debt. On the whole, our results seem consistent with the hypothesis that payday lending represents a legitimate increase in the supply of credit, not a contrived increase in credit demand. We find some interesting differences for smokers, but those diff erences are harder to interpret in relation to the predatory hypothesis without knowing apriori whether smokers are hyperbolic, or merely high, discounters. We also find, using a small set of data from different sources, that payday loan rates and fees decline signi ficantly as the number of payday lenders and pawnshops increase. Reformers often advocate usury limits to lower payday loan fees but our evidence suggests that competition among payday lenders (and pawnshops) works to lower payday loan prices. Our paper has several cousins in the academic literature. Ausubel (1991) argues that credit card lenders exploit their superior information about household credit demand in their marketing and pricing of credit cards. The predators in our model pro fit from their information advantage as well. Our concept of income delusion or deception also has a behavioral fl avor, as well, hence our use of smoking as a proxy for self-control problems. Brunnermeier and Parker (2004), for example, imagine that households choose what to expect about future income (or other outcomes). High hopes give households' current "felicity," even if it distorts borrowing and other income-dependent decisions. Our households have high hopes for income, and they make bad borrowing decisions, but we do not count the current felicity from high hopes as an o ffset to the welfare loss from overborrowing. Our costly falsi fication (of household income prospects) and costly verification (by counselors) resemble Townsend's (1979) costly state veri fication and Lacker andWeinbergs' (1989) costly state falsi fication. The main difference here is that the falsifying and verifying comes before income is realized, not after. More importantly, we hope our findings inform the current, very real-world debate, around predatory lending. The stakes in that debate are high: millions of lower income households borrow regularly from thousands of payday loan o ffices around the country. If payday lenders raise household welfare by relaxing credit constraints, anti-predatory legislation may lower it. Payday lenders make small, short-term loans to households. The typical loan is about $300 for two weeks. The typical fee is $15 per $100 borrowed. Lenders require two recent pay stubs (as proof of employment), and a recent bank account statement. Borrowers secure the loan with a post-dated personal check for the loan amount plus fees. When the loan matures, lenders deposit the check. Payday lending evolved from check cashing much like bank lending evolved from deposit taking. For a fee, check cashiers turn personal paychecks into cash. After cashing several paychecks for the same customer, lending against f uture paychecks was a natural next step. High finance charges is the main criticism against payday lenders. The typical fee of $15 per $100 per two weeks implies an annual interest rate of 15 x365/14, or 390 percent. Payday lenders are also criticize for overlending, in the sense that borrowers often re finance their loans repeatedly, and for "targeting" women making the transition from welfare-to-work (Fox and Mierzewski 2001) and soldiers (Graves and Peterson 2004). Despite their critics, payday lending has boomed. The number of payday advance o ffices grew from 0 in 1990 to 14 , 000 in 2003 (Stegman and Harris 2003). The industry originated $8 to $14 billion in loans in 2000, implying 26-47 million individual loans. Rapid entry suggests the industry is pro fitable. Payday lenders present sti ff competition for pawnshops, even though the internet, namely E-bay, signi ficantly foreclosure costs for pawnshops (Caskey 2003). The number of pawn shops in the U.S. grew about six percent per year between 1986 and 1996, but growth essentially stalled from 1997 to 2003. Prices of shares in EZCorp, the largest, publicly traded pawn shop holder, were essentially flat or declining between 1994 and 2004, while Ace Cash Express share prices, a retail financial firm selling check cashing and payday loans, rose substantially over that period (Figure 4). EZCorp CEO, Joseph Rotunday, blamed payday lenders for pawnshops' dismal performance: The company had been progressing very nicely until the late 1990s.... (when) a new product called payroll advance/payday loans came along and provided our customer base an alternative choice. Many of them elected the payday loan over the traditional pawn loan. (Quoted by Caskey (2003) p.14). Payday lending is heavily regulated (Table 1). As of 2001, eighteen states e ffectively prohibited payday loans via usury limits, and most other states prices, loan size, and loan frequency per customer (Fox and Mierzwinski 2001). Note that the payday loan limit ranges from 0 (where payday loans are illegal) to 1250. Nine states allow unlimited payday loans. Payday lenders have circumvented usury limits by a ffiliating with national or state chartered banks, but the Comptroller of the Currency��the overseer of nationally chartered banks�Crecently banned such a ffiliations. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation still permits payday lenders to a ffiliate with state banks, but recently restricted those partnerships (Graves and Peterson 2005). Regulatory risk��the threat of costly or disabling legislation in the future��looms large for Payday lenders. The Utah legislature is reconsidering its permissive laws governing payday lending. North Carolina recently drove payday lenders from the state by expressly outlawing the practice. Heavy regulation increases the cost of payday lending. High regulatory risk increases limits entry into the industry and increases the expected return required by industry investors. Driving up costs and driving away investors may be exactly what regulators intended if they view payday lending as predatory. We de fine predatory lending as a welfare reducing provision of credit. Households can be made worse o ff by borrowing if lenders can deceive households into borrowing more than is optimal. Excess borrowing reduces household welfare, and may increase default risk. We illustrate our concept of predatory lending in a standard model of household borrowing. Before we get to predatory lending, we review basic principles about welfare improving lending, the type that lets households maintain their consumption despite fluctuations in their income. The model has two periods: today (period zero) and payday (period one. Household income goes up and down periodically, but not randomly (for now): income equals zero today and y on payday. If households consume Ct in period t, their utility is U (Ct) .Household welfare is the sum of utility over both periods: U (C0)+ ��U (C1), where �� equals the household's time rate of discount. Households with high �� value current consumption highly relative to future consumption. In other words, high discounters are impatient. A digression here on discount rates serves later discussion. In classical economics �� is constant. If �� changes over time, so does household behavior, even if nothing else changes. If ��(t) is hyperbolic, households will postpone unpleasant tasks until current consumption does not seem so precious relative to future consumption (Laibson 1997). With hyperbolic discounting, that day never arrives, so hyperbolic discounters have behavioral problems: they procrastinate. They may never repay debt, much less begin saving. Hyperbolic discounters who start smoking may never quit. Returning to the model, if the marginal utility of consumption ( U 0) is diminishing, households will demand credit to reduce fluctuations in their standard of living. Households without credit, however, must fend for themselves (autarky). Welfare under autarky equals U (0)+��U (y). The fluctuations in consumption for households without credit make autarky a possible worst case, and hence, a good benchmark for comparing cases with credit. If households borrow B at interest rate r, welfare equals U (B) + ��U (y − (1 + r)B). Borrowing increases utility in period zero, when the proceeds are consumed, but lowers utility in period one, when households pay for their borrowing. Rational, informed households trade o ff the good and bad side of borrowing; they borrow until the marginal utility of consuming another unit today just equals the marginal, discounted disutility of repaying the extra debt on payday: U 0(B) = ��(1 + r)U 0(y − (1 + r)B). (1) Equation (1) determines household loan demand as a function of their income, their discount rate, and the market interest rate: B(y, ��, r). For standard utility functions, household loan demand is increasing in income and decreasing in the discount factor and interest rate: By > 0; B �� < 0; Br < 0. Household welfare with optimal borrowing equals U (B(y, r, d))+��U (y − (1+r)B( y, r, ��)). As long as households follow (1), their welfare with positive borrowing must be higher than without (autarky). The welfare gain from borrowing depends on the cost of credit production. Suppose the cost of lending $ B to a particular household equals (1 + ��)B + f, where �� represents the opportunity cost per unit loaned and f is the fixed cost per loan. Think of f as the cost of record-keeping and credit check required for each loan, however large or small the loan may be. If the going price for loans is (1+ r) per unit borrowed, the lenders' profits equal ( r − ��)B − f. With perfect competition among lenders, the loan interest rate is competed down until it just covers the costs of the loan: r = �� + f /B. Equilibrium r and B are determined where that credit supply curve equals demand (1). Equilibrium in the payday credit market is illustrated in Figure (3). If fixed costs per loan are prohibitively high, the market may not exist. Perhaps the payday lending technology lowered the fixed cost per loan enough to make the business viable.3 Before the advent of payday lending, households who applied to banks for a very small, short-term loan may have been denied. Fixed costs per loan imply that smaller loans will cost more per dollar borrowed than larger loans. That means households with low credit demand will pay higher rates than households with high loan demand. Loan demand is increasing in income, so high income households who demand larger quantities of credit will enjoy a "quantity" discount, while lower income households will pay a "small lot" premium, or penalty. That price "discrimination" is not invidious, however; the higher cost of smaller loans re flects the fixed costs of lending. The high price of payday loans may partly re flect the combination of fixed costs and small loan amounts (Flannery and Samolyk 2005). A usury limit lowers household welfare. Suppose the maximum legal interest rate is r. At that maximum rate, the minimum loan that lenders' cost is f /(r− ��) = B. Low income households with loan demand less than B face a beggar's choice: borrow B at r or do not borrow at all. Such households would be willing to pay more to to avoid going without credit, so raising the usury limit would raise welfare for those households. Competition is another key determinant of how much households gains from borrowing. 3 Alternatively, or additionaly, the demand for small, short term loans may have increased in the mid 1990s. The welfare reform then almost certainly increased demand for such credit as households who once "worked" at home for the government were forced to go to work in the market. Even with no competition �� monopoly��households cannot be worse o ff than under autarky. The monopolist raises interest rates until the marginal revenue from higher rates equals the marginal cost from lower loan demand: B (y, r) = −(r − ��)Br(y, r) . (2) At that monopoly interest rate, rm, household loan demand equals B(y, rm).Household welfare under monopoly equals U (Br(y, r m))+��U (y −(1+ rm)Br(y, r m)). Welfare is lower under monopoly because credit costs more and their standard of living fluctuates more (because costly credit reduces their demand for credit) If households borrow from the monopolist, however, they must better o ff than without credit. In sum, welfare for rational households is highest if credit is available at competitive prices. If households choose to borrow, they must be at least as well o ff as they were without credit. Limiting loan rates cannot raise household welfare and may reduce it. Monopoly lenders lower household welfare, but even with a monopolist, households cannot be worse o ff than without credit. The high cost of payday lending may partly re flect fixed costs per loan. Before payday lending, those fixed costs may have been prohibitive; very small, short-term loans may not have been worthwhile for banks. The payday lending technology may have lowered those fi xed costs, thus increasing the supply of credit to low income households demanding small loans. That version of the genesis of payday lending suggests the innovation was welfare improving, not predatory. In the textbook model household welfare cannot be lower than under autarky because households are fully informed and rational. Here we show households how can be made worse o ff than without credit if predatory lenders can delude households about their (households') future income. Suppose that by spending C(�� ), lenders can convince a prospective borrower that her income on payday will be y +��. The cost C can be interpreted variously as the cost of a guilty </a>

Name: debt1consolidation.com
Date: 10/14/07
Message: <a href="http://www.Debt1consolidation.com "> A payday loan or paycheck advance is a small, short-term loan that is intended to cover a borrower's expenses until his or her next payday. Typical loans are between $100 and $1500, on a two-week term and have interest rates in the range of 390 percent to 900 percent (annualized). The loans are also sometimes referred to as cash advances, though that term can also refer to cash provided against a prearranged line of credit such as a credit card. Though payday lending is primarily regulated at the state level, the United States Congress passed a law in October 2006 that caps lending to military personnel at 36% APR. The Defense Department called payday lending practices "predatory," and military officers cited concerns that payday lending exacerbated soldiers' financial challenges, jeopardized security clearances, and even interfered with deployment schedules to Iraq. Some federal banking regulators and legislators seek to restrict or prohibit the loans not just for military personnel, but for all borrowers [citation needed, because the high costs are viewed as an unnecessary financial drain on the lower and lower-middle class populations who are the primary borrowers. Lenders say these loans are often the only option available to consumers with bad credit or who cannot get a bank loan, credit card, or other lower-interest alternatives. Critics counter most borrowers find themselves in a worse position when the loan is due than they were when they took the loan, with many getting trapped in a cycle of debt. The industry's fast-paced growth indicates a highly profitable business model. Statistics compiled by the Center for Responsible Lending show that the majority of the industry's profit comes from repeat borrowers who are unable to repay loans on the due date and instead repeatedly renew their loans, paying fees each time Borrowers visit a payday lending store and secure a small cash loan, usually in the range of $100 to $500 with payment in full due at the borrower's next paycheck (usually a two week term). Finance charges on payday loans are typically in the range of $15 to $30 per $100 borrowed for the two-week period, which translates to rates ranging from 390 percent to 780 percent when expressed as an annual percentage rate (APR). The borrower writes a post-dated check to the lender in the full amount of the loan plus fees. On the maturity date, the borrower is expected to return to the store to repay the loan in person. If the borrower doesn't repay the loan in person, the lender may process the check traditionally or through electronic withdrawal from the borrower's checking account. If the account is short on funds to cover the check, the borrower may now face a bounced check fee from their bank in addition to the costs of the loan, and the loan may incur additional fees and/or an increased interest rate as a result of the failure to pay. For customers who cannot pay back the loan when due, members of the national trade association are required to offer an extended payment plan at no additional cost. In states like Washington, extended payment plans are required by state law. Payday lenders require the borrower to bring one or more recent pay stubs to prove that they have a steady source of income. They are also required to provide recent bank statements. Individual companies and franchises have their own underwriting criteria. Online payday loans are marketed through e-mail, online search, paid ads, and referrals. Typically, a consumer fills out an online application form or faxes a completed application that requests personal information, bank account numbers, Social Security number and employer information. Borrowers fax copies of a check, a recent bank statement, and signed paperwork. The loan is direct deposited into the consumer's checking account and loan payment or the finance charge is electronically withdrawn on the borrower's next payday. For example, a borrower seeking a payday loan may write a post-dated personal check for $460 to borrow $400 for up to 14 days. The payday lender agrees to hold the check until the borrower's next payday. At that time, the borrower has the option to redeem the check by paying $460 in cash, or renew the loan ( a.k.a. "flip the loan") by paying off the $460 and then immediately taking an additional loan of $400, in effect extending the loan for another two weeks. In many states, "flipping" or "rolling over" the loan is not allowed. In states where there is an extended payment plan, the borrower could choose to opt into a payment plan. If the borrower does not refinance the loan, the lender may deposit the check. In this example, the cost of the initial loan is a $60 finance charge, or 390% percent APR. When the Consumer Federation of America conducted a survey of 100 internet payday loan sites, it found loans from $200 to $2,500 were available, with $500 the most frequently offered. Finance charges ranged from $10 per $100 up to $30 per $100 borrowed. The most frequent rate was $25 per $100, or 650% annual interest rate (APR) if the loan is repaid in two weeks. Regulation of lending institutions is handled primarily by individual states, and this growing industry exists atop an active and shifting legal landscape. Lenders lobby to enable payday lending practices, while opponents of the industry lobby to prohibit the high cost loans in the name of consumer protection. Payday lending is legal and regulated in 37 states. In Georgia and 12 other states, it is either illegal or not feasible, given state law.When not explicitly banned, laws that prohibit payday lending are usually in the form of usury limits: hard interest rate caps calculated strictly by APR. In the United States, most states have usury laws which forbid interest rates in excess of a certain APR. Payday lenders have succeeded in getting around usury laws in some states by forming relationships with banks chartered in a different state with no usury ceiling (such as South Dakota or Delaware). This practice has been referred to as "Rate exportation", the "agency model" and the "rent-a-bank" model. Under the legal doctrine of rate exportation, established by Marquette Nat. Bank v. First of Omaha Corp. 439 U. 299 (1978), the loan is governed by the laws of the state the bank is chartered in. This is the same doctrine that allows credit card issuers based in South Dakota and Delaware ? states that abolished their usury laws ? to offer credit cards nationwide.As federal banking regulators became aware of this practice, they began prohibiting these partnerships between commercial banks and payday lenders. The FDIC still allows its member banks to participate in payday lending, but it did issue guidelines in March 2005 that are meant to discourage long term debt cycles by transitioning to a longer term loan after 6 payday loan renewals. For usury laws to be effective, they need to include all loan fees as part of the interest. Otherwise, lenders can charge any amount they want as fees and still claim a low interest rate. Some states have laws limiting the number of loans a borrower can take at a single time. Some states also cap the number of loans per borrower per year, or require that after a fixed number of loan-renewals, the lender must offer a lower interest loan with a longer term, so that the borrower can eventually get out of the debt cycle. Borrowers often circumvent these laws by taking loans from more than one lender. On March 1, 2006, the North Carolina Department of Justice announced the state had negotiated agreements with all the payday lenders operating in the state. The state contended that the practice of funding payday loans through banks chartered in other states illegally circumvents North Carolina law. Under the terms of the agreements, the lenders will stop making new loans, will collect only principal on existing loans and will pay $700,000 to non-profit organizations for relief. Georgia law prohibited payday lending for more than 100 years, but the state was not successful in shutting the industry down until the 2004 legislation made payday lending a felony, allowed for racketeering charges and permitted potentially costly class-action lawsuits. New Mexico will cap fees, restrict total loans by a consumer and prohibit immediate loan rollovers, in which a consumer takes out a new loan to pay off a previous loan, under a new law that takes effect November 1, 2007. A borrower who is unable to repay a loan will automatically be offered a 130-day payment plan, with no fees or interest. Once a loan is repaid, under the new law, the borrower must wait 10 days before obtaining another payday loan. The law will allow the term of a loan to run from 14 to 35 days, with the fees capped at $15.50 for each $100 borrowed. There also will be a 50-cent administrative fee to cover costs of lenders verifying whether a borrower qualifies for the loan, such as determining whether the consumer is still paying off a previous loan. A borrower's cumulative payday loans could not exceed 25 percent of the individual's gross monthly income. According to the Canadian Criminal Code, any rate of interest charged above 60% per annum is considered criminal. On August 14, 2006 the Supreme oBritishColumbiassued its decision in a class action lawsuit against A OK Payday Loans. A OK charged its customers 21% interest, as well as a "processing" fee of C$9.50 for every $50.00 borrowed. In addition a "deferral" fee of $25.00 for every $100.00 was charged if a customer wanted to delay payment. The judge ruled that the processing and deferral fees were interest, and that A OK was charging its customers a criminal rate of interest. The payout as a result of this decision is expected to be several million dollars The British Columbia Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed this decision. Federal legislation passed in the spring of 2007 transferred regulatory authority on payday loans to the provinces. Payday lending is a controversial practice and faces both legal battles and public perception challenges in nearly every state. Critics blame payday lenders for exploiting people's financial hardship for profit. Lenders target the young and the poor, particularly those near military bases and in low-income communities. Borrowers may not understand that the high interest rates are likely to trap them in a "debt-cycle," where they have to repeatedly renew the loan and pay associated fees every two weeks until they can finally save enough to pay off the principal and get out of debt. Critics point out that payday lending unfairly disadvantages the poor, compared to the middle class who pay at most 25% or so on their credit cards. However, supporters argue that some individuals that require the use of payday loans have already exhausted or ruined any other alternatives. They may not be able to obtain a credit card, or rely on secondary sources (such as loans from friends and family members) By law, a payday lender can use only the same industry standard collection practices used to collect other debts. In many cases, the borrower has written a post-dated check to the lender; if the borrower defaults, then this check will bounce. Some payday lenders have therefore threatened delinquent borrowers with criminal prosecution, for check fraud. This practice is illegal in many jurisdictions and has resulted in regulatory action. Defenders of the higher interest rates say processing costs for payday loans do not differ much from other loans, including home mortgages. They argue that conventional interest rates for lower dollar amounts and shorter terms would not be profitable. For example, a $100 one-week loan, at a 20% APR (compounded weekly) would generate only 38 cents of interest, which would fail to match loan processing costs. Critics say payday lenders' processing costs are significantly lower than costs for mortgages and other traditional loans. Payday lenders usually look at recent pay-stubs, whereas larger-loan lenders do full credit checks and making a determination about the borrower's ability to pay back the loan. A study by the FDIC Center for Financial Research found "operating costs lie in the range of advance fees" collected and that, after subtracting fixed operating costs and "unusually high rate of default losses," payday loans "may not necessarily yield extraordinary profits." Based on the annual reports of publicly traded payday loan companies, loan losses can average 15% or more of loan revenue. Underwriters of payday loans must also deal with people presenting fraudulent checks as security or making stop payments. Critics concede that some borrowers may default on the loans, but point to the industry's pace of growth as an indication of its profitability. Consumer advocates condemn the practice as a whole, regardless of its profitability, because it "takes advantage of consumers who are already hard-pressed to pay their debts". Proponents claim that cash advance loans provide a service that is not available from other sources. Many credit unions have attempted to offer similar products, but have been unable to do so without government subsidies or grants, a fact that many lenders and reports have highlighted. Furthermore, most of these programs offered by credit unions have ended due to the high default rates of lenders. A staff report released by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York concluded that payday loans should not be categorized as "predatory" since they may improve household welfare. "Defining and Detecting Predatory Lending" reports "if payday lenders raise household welfare by relaxing credit constraints, anti-predatory legislation may lower it." The author of the report, Donald P. Morgan, defined predatory lending as "a welfare reducing provision of credit." Results of the report indicated that payday loans may actually do the opposite by improving the welfare of the consumer. Many believe that payday loans are the only option for consumers with bad credit, but other options do exist and most financial counselors would direct people to explore the alternatives. Other options are available to most payday loan customers.These include credit union loans with lower interest and more stringent terms credit payment plans, paycheck cash advances from employers, bank overdraft protection, cash advances from credit cards, emergency community assistance plans, small consumer loans and direct loans from family or friends. Payday lenders do not compare their interest rates to those of mainstream lenders. Instead, they compare their fees to the overdraft, late payment and penalty fees that will be incurred if the customer is unable to secure any credit whatsoever. The lenders therefore list a different set of alternatives (costs expressed here as APRs for two-week terms): $100 payday advance with $15 fee = 391% APR; $100 bounced check with $48 NSF/merchant fees = 1,251% APR; $100 credit card balance with $26 late fee = 678% APR; $100 utility bill with $50 late/reconnect fees = 1,304% APR. A minority of mainstream banks offer advances for customers whose paychecks or other funds are deposited electronically into their accounts. The terms are similar to those of a payday loan; a customer receives a predetermined cash credit available for immediate withdrawal. The amount is deducted, along with a fee, usually about 10 percent of the amount borrowed, when the next direct deposit is posted to the customer's account. After the programs attracted regulatory attention Wells Fargo called its fee "voluntary" and offered to waive it for any reason. It later scaled back the program in several states. Income tax preparation firms often partner with lenders to offer "refund anticipation loans" to filers. These loans are not technically payday loans (because they are repayable upon receipt of the borrower's income tax refund, not at his next payday), but they have similar credit and cost characteristics. A car title loan is similar to a payday loan, but it is secured by the borrower's car. These loans are available only to borrowers who hold clear title ( i.e., no other loans) to a vehicle. The maximum amount of the loan is some fraction of the resale value of the car. These loans may be available on slightly better terms than an unsecured payday loan, since they are less risky to the lender. If the borrower defaults, then the lender can still recover costs by repossessing and reselling the car </a>

Name: debt1consolidation.com
Date: 10/13/07
Message: <a href="http://www.Debt1consolidation.com "> it has become very easy to borrow loans these days. Advancements in technology particularly with the Internet have made it convenient for loan seekers to track the loan of their choice. With just a few clicks on a lender's website you can access the desired loan online. The ease with which loans are available online nowadays is the main reason behind the growing number of debt-related problems. The vast number of loans taken on different occasions may have benefited you many times and may have even been a lifesaver in an urgent situation. However, you may not have known that these loans can pose a threat to you. Now you have to remember which lender to pay, how much and when. Failing to pay any of the installments on the loan may affect your credit score adversely. In such circumstances, debts become a burden. You may get into a life-long debt trap if you don't know how to handle these debts. A debt management program in such conditions can work as an effective debt management tool helping you in reducing the debt burden. Here are a few debt management tips that can help you in managing your debts and getting your life back on the right track: Create A Budget An organized and well-planned budget can help you in keeping control over your monthly expenses. Write down each and every financial transaction you do each month; this will help you stay on track. It will give you a real idea of your finances and thus you can make the decision accordingly. A budget will give you an overview about how many funds you do have and how you are going to disburse the expenses with the available money. Setting up the budget is not enough: what is important is to stick to it. Consolidate High Interest Loans Consolidate your debts that carry a high rate of interest with a debt consolidation loan. A debt consolidation loan can work as an effective debt management tool. It will help you in getting rid of the debt burden by reducing the monthly outgoings. With a debt consolidation loan, you will get freedom from all the hassles involved in dealing with several creditors, you will be accountable to only one loan, one lender and one lower monthly installment. Avoid taking on new credit If you are already in a debt trap, avoid taking up a new loan. Borrowing a new loan may be of great help to you, but it will be in the short term. It may increase the debt burden and will add to your troubles rather then solving them. Debt Management Counseling You can also seek for advice from debt management counselors. The majority of the lenders in the US engage debt management counselors who have years of experience and can provide you with an easy road map to get rid of the debt trap by paying off the existing debts. Learn To Save A need for a loan arises when you do not have sufficient funds in your saving account to meet your personal desires. Make saving a habit, try not to overspend on unnecessary things. No, don't become a miser but use the funds carefully, a little sum of money saved today will be highly beneficial for you in the future and will make it easy for you to deal emergency cash need with the available funds on the right time and in the right manner. Debt management is a time-consuming process. You can save your time and hard-earned money by employing a debt management company who will take care of your debt and can offer effective solutions to all your debt-related problems. Tips for managing debts employed in the right manner can curb the menace created by debts, helping you get out of debt in an easier way. Paying off the existing debts will help you in securing a smoother and easier life for the future </a>

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